Synthesis is the automated construction of a system from its specification. The system has to satisfy its specification in all possible environments. Modern systems often interact with other systems, or agents. Many times these agents have objectives of their own, other than to fail the system. Thus, it makes sense to model system environments not as hostile, but as composed of rational agents; i.e., agents that act to achieve their own objectives.
Introduction
Synthesis is the automated construction of a system from its specification. The basic idea is simple and appealing: instead of developing a system and verifying that it adheres to its specification, we would like to have an automated procedure that, given a specification, constructs a system that is correct by construction. The first formulation of synthesis goes back to Church [10] ; the modern approach to synthesis was initiated by Pnueli and Rosner, who introduced LTL (linear temporal logic) synthesis [32] . In LTL synthesis, the specification is given in LTL and the output is a reactive system modeled by a finite-state transducer. Much of today's research in formal verification is aimed at increasing the practicality of automated synthesis, and it addresses challenges like simplification of synthesis algorithms [19] , compositionality and modularity [17, 23] , extensions of the basic setting to richer ones (c.f., synthesis of distributed systems, concurrent systems, and on-line algorithms [1, 2, 18, 25] ), and extensions of the underline techniques to further applications (c.f. automated control and repair [14, 33] ).
In synthesis, there is a distinction between system outputs, controlled by the system, and system inputs, controlled by the environment. A system should be able to cope with all values of the input signals, while setting the output signals to desired values [32] . Therefore, the quantification structure on input and output signals is different. Input signals are universally quantified while output signals are existentially quantified.
Modern systems often interact with other systems. For example, the clients interacting with a server are by themselves distinct entities (which we call agents) and are many times implemented by systems. In the traditional approach to synthesis, the way in which the environment is composed of its underlying agents is abstracted. In particular, the agents can be seen as if their only objective is to conspire to fail the system. Hence the term "hostile environment" that is traditionally used in the context of synthesis. In real life, however, many times agents have goals of their own, other than to fail the system. The approach taken in the field of algorithmic game theory [29] is to assume that agents interacting with a computational system are rational, i.e., agents act to achieve their own goals. Assuming agents rationality is a restriction on the agents behavior and is therefore equivalent to restricting the universal quantification on the environment. Thus, the following question arises: can system synthesizers capitalize on the rationality and goals of agents interacting with the system? Consider for example a peer-to-peer network with only two agents. Each agent is interested in downloading infinitely often, but has no incentive to upload. In order, however, for one agent to download, the other agent Classical applications of game theory consider games with real-valued payoffs. For example, agents may bid on goods or grade candidates. In the peer-to-peer network example, one may want to refer to the amount of data uploaded by each agent, or one may want to add the possibility of pricing downloads. The full quantitative setting is undecidable already in the context of model checking [3] . Yet, several special cases for which the problem is decidable have been studied [4] . We can distinguish between cases in which decidability is achieved by restricting the type of systems [3] , and cases in which it is achieved by restricting the domain of values [13] . We solve the quantitative rational synthesis problem for the case the domain of values is a finite distributive De Morgan lattice. The lattice setting is a good starting point to the quantitative setting. First, lattices have been successfully handled for easier problems, and in particular, multi-valued synthesis [15, 16] . In addition, lattices are sufficiently rich to express interesting quantitative properties. This is sometime immediate (for example, in the peer-to-peer network, one can refer to the different attributions of the communication channels, giving rise to the lattice of the subsets of the attributions), and sometimes thanks to the fact that real values can often be abstracted to finite linear orders. From a technical point of view, our contribution here is a solution of a latticed game in which the value of the game cannot be obtained by joining values obtained by different strategies, which is unacceptable in synthesis.
Related Work
Already early work on synthesis has realized that working with a hostile environment is often too restrictive. The way to address this point, however, has been by adding assumptions on the environment, which can be part of the specification (c.f., [5] ). The first to consider the game-theoretic approach to dealing with rationality of the environment in the context of LTL synthesis were Chatteerjee and Henzinger [8] . The setting in [8] , however, is quite restricted; it considers exactly three players, where the third player is a fair scheduler, and the notion of secure equilibria [6] . Secure equilibria, introduced in [6] , is a Nash equilibria in which each of the two players prefers outcomes in which only his objective is achieved over outcomes in which both objectives are achieved, which he still prefers over outcomes in which his objective is not achieved. It is not clear how this notion can be extended to multiplayer games, and to the distinction we make here between controllable agents that induce the game (the system) and rational agents (the environment). Also, the set of solution concepts we consider is richer. Ummels [37] was the first to consider subgame perfect equilibria in the context of infinite multiplayer games. The setting there is of turn-based games and the solution goes via a reduction to 2-player games. Here, we consider concurrent games and therefore cannot use such a reduction. Another difference is that [37] considers parity winning conditions whereas we use LTL objectives. In addition, the fact that the input to the rational synthesis problem does not include a game makes the memoryful nature of subgame perfect equilibria more challenging, as we cannot easily reduce the LTL formulas to memoryless parity games.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to handle the multi-valued setting. As we show, while the lattice case is decidable, its handling required a nontrivial extension of both the Boolean setting and the algorithms known for solving latticed games [16] .
Preliminaries
We consider infinite concurrent multiplayer games (in short, games) defined as follows. A game arena is a tuple G = V, v 0 , I, (Σ i ) i∈I , (Γ i ) i∈I , δ , where V is a set of nodes, v 0 is an initial node, I is a set of players, and for i ∈ I, the set Σ i is the set of actions of Player i and Γ i : V → 2 Σ i specifies the actions that Player i can take at each node. Let I = {1, . . . , n}. Then, the transition relation δ : V × Σ 1 × · · · × Σ n → V is a deterministic function mapping the current node and the current choices of the agents to the successor node. The transition function may be restricted to its relevant domain. Thus, δ(v, σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) is defined for v ∈ V and σ 1 , . . . , σ n ∈
A position in the game is a tuple v, σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ n with v ∈ V and σ i ∈ Γ i (v) for every i ∈ I. Thus, a position describes a state along with possible choices of actions for the players in this state. Consider a sequence 
We use P G (or simply P when G is clear from the context) to denote all possible plays of G.
Note that at every node v ∈ V , each player i chooses an action σ i ∈ Γ i (v) simultaneously and independently of the other players. The game then proceeds to the successor node δ(v, σ 1 , . . . , σ n ). A strategy for Player i is a function π i : V + → Σ i that maps histories of the game to an action suggested to Player i. The suggestion has to be consistent with Γ i . Thus, for every
Let Π i denote the set of possible strategies for Player i. For a set of players I = {1, . . . , n}, a strategy profile is a tuple of strategies π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π n ∈ Π 1 × Π 2 × · · · × Π n . We denote the strategy profile by (π i ) i∈I (or simply π, when I is clear from the context). We say that p is an outcome of the profile π if for all k ≥ 0 and i ∈ I, we have
Thus, p is an outcome of π if all the players adhere to their strategies in π. Note that since δ is deterministic, π fixes a single play from each state of the game. Given a profile π we denote by outcome(π) G (or simply outcome(π)) the one play in G that is the outcome of π when starting in v 0 . Given a strategy profile π and a nonempty sequence of nodes h = v 0 v 1 . . . v k , we define the shift of π by h as the strategy profile (π h i ) i∈I in which for all i ∈ I and all histories w ∈ V * , we have π h i (w) = π i (h · w). We denote by outcome(π) G h (or simply outcome(π) h ) the concatenation of v 0 v 1 . . . v k−1 with the one play in G that is the outcome of π h when starting in v k . Thus, outcome(π) h describes the outcome of a game that has somehow found itself with history h, and from that point, the players behave if the history had been h. Given a profile (π i ) i∈I , an index j ∈ I, and a strategy π ′ j for Player j, we use (π −j , π ′ j ) to refer to the profile of strategies in which the strategy for all players but j is as in π, and the strategy for Player j is π ′ j . Thus,
Rational Synthesis
In this section we define the problem of rational synthesis. We work with the following model: the world consists of the system and a set of n agents Agent 1, . . . , Agent n. For uniformity we refer to the system as Agent 0. We assume that Agent i controls a set X i of variables, and the different sets are pairwise disjoint. At each point in time, each agent sets his variables to certain values. Thus, an action of Agent i amounts to assigning values to his variables. Accordingly, the set of actions of Agent i is given by 2 X i . We use X to denote 0≤i≤n X i . We use X −i to denote X \ X i for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Each of the agents (including the system) has an objective. The objective of an agent is formulated using a linear temporal logic formula (LTL [31] ) over the set of variables of all agents. 2 We use ϕ i to denote the objective of Agent i. This setting induces the game arena G = V, v 0 , I, (Σ i ) i∈I , (Γ i ) i∈I , δ defined as follows. The set of players I = {0, 1, . . . , n} consists of the system and the agents. The moves of agent i are all the possible assignments to its variables. Thus, Σ i = 2 X i . We use Σ, Σ i , and Σ −i to denote the sets 2 X , 2 X i , and 2 X −i , respectively. An agent can set his variables as he wishes throughout the game. Thus Γ i (v) = Σ i for every v ∈ V . The game records in its vertices all the actions taken by the agents so far. Hence, V = Σ * and for all v ∈ Σ * and σ 0 , . . . , σ n ∈ Σ, we have
At each moment in time, the system gets as input an assignment in Σ −0 and it generates as output an assignment in Σ 0 . For every possible history h ∈ (Σ −0 ∪ Σ 0 ) * the system should decide what σ 0 ∈ Σ 0 it outputs next. Thus, a strategy for the system is a function π 0 : Σ * → Σ 0 (recall that Σ = Σ −0 ∪ Σ 0 and note that indeed V + = Σ * ). In the standard synthesis problem, we say that π 0 realizes ϕ 0 if all the computations that π 0 generates satisfy ϕ 0 . In rational synthesis, on the other hand, we also generate strategies for the other agents, and the single computation that is the outcome of all the strategies should satisfy ϕ 0 . That is, we require outcome(π) G |= ϕ 0 where G is as defined above. In addition, we should generate the strategies for the other agents in a way that would guarantee that they indeed adhere to their strategies.
Recall that while we control the system, we have no control on the behaviors of Agent 1, . . . , Agent n. Let π 0 : Σ * → Σ 0 be a strategy for the system in G. Then, π 0 induces the game
, where for i ∈ I \ {0}, we have Γ ′ i = Γ i , and Γ ′ 0 (w) = {π 0 (w −0 )}, where w −0 is obtained form w by projecting its letters on Σ −0 . Recall that δ is restricted to the relevant domain. Thus, as Γ ′ 0 is deterministic, we can regard G π 0 as an n-player (rather than n + 1-player) game. Note that G π 0 contains all the possible behaviors of Agent 1, . . . , Agent n, when the system adheres to π 0 .
Definition 3.1 (Rational Synthesis)
Consider a solution concept γ. The problem of rational synthesis (with solution concept γ) is to return, given LTL formulas ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n , specifying the objectives of the system and the agents constituting its environment, a strategy profile π = π 0 , π 1 , . . . , π n ∈ Π 0 × Π 1 × · · · × Π n such that both (a) outcome(π) G |= ϕ 0 and (b) the strategy profile π 1 , . . . , π n is a solution in the game G π 0 with respect to the solution concept γ.
The rational-synthesis problem gets a solution concept as a parameter. As discussed in Section 1, the fact π 1 , . . . , π n is a solution with respect to the concept guarantees that it is not worthwhile for the agents constituting the environment to deviate from the strategies assigned to them. Several solution concepts are studied and motivated in game theory. We focus on three leading concepts, and we first recall their definitions and motivations in game theory. The common setting in game theory is that the objective for each player is to maximize his payoff -a real number that is a function of the play. We use payoff i : P → R to denote the payoff function of player i. That is, payoff i assigns to each possible play p a real number payoff i (p) expressing the payoff of i on p. For a strategy profile π we use (with a slight abuse of notation) payoff i (π) to abbreviate payoff i (outcome(π)).
The simplest and most appealing solution concept is dominant-strategies solution. A dominant strategy is a strategy that a player can never lose by adhering to, regardless of the strategies of the other players. Therefore, if there is a profile of strategies π in which all strategies π i are dominant, then no player has an incentive to deviate from the strategy assigned to him in π. Formally, π is a dominant strategy profile if for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n and for every profile π ′ with
Consider, for example, a game played by three players: Alice, Bob and Charlie whose actions are {a 1 , a 2 }, {b 1 , b 2 } and {c 1 , c 2 }, respectively. The game is played on the game arena depicted in the left of Figure 1 . The labels on the edges are marked by the possible action moves. Each player wants to visit infinitely often a node marked by his initial letter. In this game, Bob's strategy of choosing b 1 from Node 2 is a dominant strategy. All of the strategies of Charlie are dominating. Alice, though, has no dominating strategy. Unfortunately, in many games some agents do not have dominant strategies, thus no dominant-strategy solution exists. Naturally, if no dominant strategy solution exists, one would still like to consider other solution concepts.
Another well known solution concept is Nash equilibrium [27] . A strategy profile is Nash equilibrium if no player has an incentive to deviate from his strategy in π provided he assumes the other players adhere to the strategies assigned to them in π. Formally, π is a Nash equilibrium profile if for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n and for every strategy
For example, the strategy profile depicted in the middle of Figure 1 by dotted edges is a Nash equilibrium of the game to its left. Knowing the strategy of the other players, each player cannot gain by deviating from his strategy.
An important advantage of Nash equilibrium is that a Nash equilibrium exists in almost every game [30] . 3 A weakness of Nash equilibrium is that it is not nearly as stable as a dominant-strategy solution: if one of the other players deviates from his assigned strategy, nothing is guaranteed.
Nash equilibrium is suited to a type of games in which the players make all their decisions without knowledge of other players choices. The type of games considered in rational synthesis, however, are different, as players do have knowledge about the choices of the other players in earlier rounds of the game. To see the problem that this setting poses for Nash equilibrium, let us consider the ULTIMATUM game. In ULTIMATUM, Player 1 chooses a value x ∈ [0, 1], and then Player 2 chooses whether to accept the choice, in which case the payoff of Player 1 is x and the payoff of Player 2 is 1 − x, or to reject the choice, in which case the payoff of both players is 0. One Nash equilibrium in ULTIMATUM is π = π 1 , π 2 in which π 1 advises Player 1 to always choose x = 1 and π 2 advises Player 2 to always reject. It is not hard to see that π is indeed a Nash equilibrium. In particular, if Player 2 assumes that Player 1 follows π 1 , he has no incentive to deviate from π 2 . Still, the equilibrium is unstable. The reason is that π 2 is inherently not credible. If Player 1 chooses x smaller than 1, it is irrational for Player 2 to reject, and Player 1 has no reason to assume that Player 2 adheres to π 2 . This instability of a Nash equilibrium is especially true in a setting in which the players have information about the choices made by the other players. In particular, in ULTIMATUM, Player 1 knows that Player 2 would make his choice after knowing what x is.
To figure. It is, however, not very rational. The reason is that if Alice deviates from her strategy by choosing a 2 rather than a 1 then it is irrational for Bob to stick to his strategy. Indeed, if he sticks to his strategy he does not meet his objective, yet if he deviates and chooses b 1 he does meet his objective.
This instability of Nash equilibrium has been addressed in the definition of subgame-perfect equilibrium [35] . A strategy profile π is in subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) if for every possible history of the game, no player has an incentive to deviate from his strategy in π provided he assumes the other players adhere to the strategies assigned to them in π. Formally, π is an SPE profile if for every possible history h of the game, player 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and strategy π ′ i = π i , we have that
The dotted strategy depicted in the middle of Figure 1 is a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Indeed, it is a Nash equilibrium from every possible node of the arena, including non-reachable ones.
In the context of on-going behaviors, real-valued payoffs are a big challenge and most works on reactive systems use Boolean temporal-logic as a specification language. Below we adjust the definition of the three solution concepts to the case the objectives are LTL formulas. 4 Essentially, the adjustment is done by assuming the following simple payoffs: If the objective ϕ i of Agent i holds, then his payoff is 1; otherwise his payoff is 0. The induced solution concepts are then as followed. Consider a strategy profile π = π 1 , . . . , π n .
•
• We say that π is a subgame-perfect equilibrium profile if for every history h ∈ Σ * , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and profile
Solution in the Boolean Setting
In this section we solve the rational-synthesis problem. Let I = {0, 1, . . . , n} denote the set of agents. Recall that Σ i = 2 X i and Σ = 2 X , where X = ∪ i∈I X i , and that the partition of the variables among the agents induces a game arena with states in Σ * . Expressing rational synthesis involves properties of strategies and histories. Strategy Logic [7] is a logic that treats strategies in games as explicit first-order objects. Given an LTL formula ψ and strategy variables z 0 , . . . , z n ranging over strategies of the agents, the strategy logic formula ψ(z 0 , . . . , z n ) states that ψ holds in the outcome of the game in which Agent i adheres to the strategy z i . The use of existential and universal quantifiers on strategy variables enables strategy logic to state that a given profile consists of dominant strategies or is a Nash equilibrium. However, strategy logic is not strong enough to state the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium. The reason is that a formula ϕ(z 0 , . . . , z n ) in strategy logic assumes that the strategies z 0 , . . . , z n are computed from the initial vertex of the game, and it cannot refer to histories that diverge from the strategies. We therefore extend strategy logic with first order variables that range over arbitrary histories of the game.
Extended Strategy Logic
Formulas of Extended Strategy Logic (ESL) are defined with respect to a game G = V, v 0 , I, (Σ i ) i∈I , (Γ i ) i∈I , δ , a set H of history variables, and sets Z i of strategy variables for i ∈ I. Let I = {0, . . . , n}, Σ = Σ 0 × · · · × Σ n , and let ψ be an LTL formula over Σ. Let h be a history variable in H, and let z 0 , ..., z n be strategy variables in Z 0 , . . . , Z n , respectively. We use z as an abbreviation for z 0 , ..., z n . The set of ESL formulas is defined inductively as follows. 5
We use the usual abbreviations ∧, →, and ∀. We denote by free(Ψ) the set of strategy and history variables that are free (not in a scope of a quantifier) in Ψ. A formula Ψ is closed if free(Ψ) = ∅. The alternation depth of a variable of a closed formula is the number of quantifier switches (∃∀ or ∀∃, in case the formula is in positive normal form) that bind the variable. The alternation depth of closed formula Ψ is the maximum alternation depth of a variable occurring in the formula. We now define the semantics of ESL. Intuitively, an ESL formula of the form ψ(z; h) is interpreted over the game whose prefix matches the history h and the suffix starting where h ends is the outcome of the game that starts at the last vertex of h and along which each agent i ∈ I adheres to his strategy in z. Let X ⊆ H ∪ i∈I Z i be a set of variables. An assignment A X assigns to every history variable h ∈ X ∩ H, a history A X (h) ∈ V + and assigns to every strategy variable z i ∈ X ∩ Z i , a strategy A X (z i ) ∈ Π i . Given an assignment A X and a strategy π i ∈ Π i , we denote by
For histories of the game w ∈ V + we define A X [h ← w] similarly. We now describe when a given game G and a given assignment A X satisfy an ESL formula Ψ, where X is such that free(Ψ) ⊆ X. For LTL, the semantics is as usual [24] .
] to denote its set of satisfying assignments; that is,
Given an ESL formula Ψ and a game graph G, we denote by
Before we show how [[Ψ]] G can be computed we show that ESL is strong enough to express the solution to the rational-synthesis problems for the three solution concepts we study.
Expressing Rational Synthesis
We now show that the rational synthesis problem for the three solution concepts we study can be stated in ESL. We first state that a given strategy profile y = (y i ) i∈I is a solution concept on the game G y 0 , that is, the game induced by G when Agent 0 adheres to his strategy in y. We use I −0 to denote the set {1, . . . , n}, that is, the set of all agents except for the system, which is Agent 0. Given a strategy profile z = (z i ) i∈I , we use (z −{i,0} , y i , y 0 ) to denote the strategy profile where all agents but i and 0 follow z and agents i and 0 follow y i and y 0 , respectively. For i ∈ I, let ϕ i be the objective of Agent i. For a solution concept γ ∈ {DS, NASH, SPE} and a strategy profile y = (y i ) i∈I , the formula Ψ γ (y), expressing that the profile (y i ) i∈I −0 is a solution with respect to γ in G y 0 , is defined as follows.
• Ψ DS (y) :
We can now state the existence of a solution to the rational-synthesis problem with input ϕ 0 , . . . , ϕ n by the closed formula Φ γ := ∃(y i ) i∈I .(ϕ 0 ((y i ) i∈I ) ∧ Ψ γ ((y i ) i∈I )). Indeed, the formula specifies the existence of a strategy profile whose outcome satisfies ϕ 0 and for which the strategies for the agents in I −0 constitute a solution with respect to γ in the game induced by y 0 .
ESL Decidability
In order to solve the rational-synthesis problem we are going to use automata on infinite trees. Given a set D of directions, a D-tree is the set D * . The elements in D * are the nodes of the tree. The node ǫ is the root of the tree. For a node u ∈ D * and a direction d ∈ D, the node u · d is the successor of u with direction d. Given D and an alphabet Σ, a Σ-labeled D-tree is a pair D * , τ such that τ : D * → Σ maps each node of D * to a letter in Σ. A = Σ, D, Q, δ 0 , δ, χ , where Σ is the input alphabet, D is the directions set, Q is a finite set of states, δ 0 is the initial condition, δ is the transition relation and χ : Q → {1, . . . , k} is the parity condition. The initial condition δ 0 is a positive boolean formula over Q specifying the initial condition. For example, (q 1 ∨ q 2 ) ∧ q 3 specifies that the APT accepts the input tree if it accepts it from state q 3 as well as from q 1 or q 2 . The transition function δ maps each state and letter to a boolean formula over D × Q. Thus, as with δ 0 , the idea is to allow the automaton to send copies of itself in different states. In δ, the copies are sent to the successors of the current node, thus each state is paired with the direction to which the copy should proceed. Due to the lack of space, we refer the reader to [11] for the definition of runs and acceptance.
An alternating parity tree automaton (APT) is a tuple
Base ESL formulas, of the form ψ(z, h), refer to exactly one strategy variable for each agent, and one history variable. The assignment for these variables can be described by a (Σ × {⊥, ⊤})-labeled Σ-tree, where the Σ-component of the labels is used in order to describe the strategy profile π assigned to the strategy variable, and the {⊥, ⊤}-component of the labels is used in order to label the tree by a unique finite path corresponding to the history variable. We refer to a (Σ × {⊥, ⊤})-labeled Σ-tree as a strategy-history tree. A node u = d 0 d 1 . . . d k in a strategy-history tree Σ * , τ corresponds to a history of the play in which at time 0 ≤ j ≤ k, the agents played as recorded in d j . A label τ (u) = (σ 0 , . . . , σ n , ⊣) of node u describes (1) for each agent i, an action σ i that the strategy π i advises Agent i to take when the history of the game so far is u, and (2) whether the node is along the path corresponding to the history. Among the |Σ| successors of u in the strategy-history tree, only the successor u · τ (u) corresponds to a scenario in which all the agents adhere to their strategies in the strategy profile described in Σ * , τ . We say that a path ρ in Σ * , τ is obedient if for all nodes u · d ∈ ρ, for u ∈ Σ * and d ∈ Σ, we have d = τ (u). Note that there is a single obedient path in every strategy tree. This path corresponds to the single play in which all agents adhere to their strategies. The {⊥, ⊤} labeling is legal if there is a unique finite path starting at the root, all of whose node are marked with ⊤. Note that there is a single path in the tree whose prefix is marked by ⊤'s and whose suffix is obedient.
An ESL formula Ψ may contain several base formulas. Therefore, Ψ may contain, for each i ∈ I, several strategy variables in Z i and several history variables in H. 1 × · · · × Σ mn n × {⊥, ⊤} m . We solve the rational synthesis problem using tree automata that run on Υ-labeled Σ-trees. Note that the specification of rational synthesis involves an external quantification of a strategy profile. We construct an automaton U that accepts all trees that describe a strategy profile that meets the desired solution. A witness to the nonemptiness of the automaton then induces the desired strategies.
We define U as an APT. Consider an ESL formula ψ(z, h). Consider a strategy tree Σ * , τ . Recall that ψ should hold along the path that starts at the root of the tree, goes through h, and then continues to outcome(z) h . Thus, adding history variables to strategy logic results in a memoryful logic [21] , in which LTL formulas have to be evaluated not along a path that starts at the present, but along a path that starts at the root and goes through the present. The memoryful semantics imposes a real challenge on the decidability problem, as one has to follow all the possible runs of a nondeterministic automaton for ψ, which involves a satellite implementing the subset construction of this automaton [21] . Here, we use instead the {⊥, ⊤}-component of the label of τ .
The definition of the APTA Ψ for [[Ψ]] G works by induction on the structure of Ψ. At the base level, we have formulas of the form ψ(z, h), where ψ is an LTL formula, z is a strategy profile, and h is a history variable. The constructed automaton then has three tasks. The first task is to check that the {⊥, ⊤} labeling is legal; i.e. there is a unique path in the tree marked by ⊤'s. The second task is to detect the single path that goes through h and continues from h according to the strategy profile z. The third task is to check that this path satisfies ψ. The inductive steps then built on APT complementation, intersection, union and projection [26] . In particular, as in strategy logic, quantification over a strategy variable for agent i is done by "projecting out" the corresponding Σ i label from the tree. That is, given an automaton A for Ψ, the automaton for ∃z i .Ψ ignores the Σ i component that refers to z i and checks A on a tree where this component is guessed. The quantification over history variables is similar. Given an automaton A for Ψ the automaton for ∃h.Ψ ignores the {⊥, ⊤} part of the label that corresponds to h and checks A on a tree where the {⊥, ⊤} part of the label is guessed. 
Solving Rational Synthesis
We can now reduce rational-synthesis to APT emptiness.
Theorem 4.2
The LTL rational-synthesis problem is 2EXPTIME-complete for the solution concepts of dominant strategy, Nash equilibrium, and subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proof:
We have shown in Section 4.2 that the rational-synthesis problem for γ ∈ {DS, NASH, SPE} can be specified by an ESL formula Φ γ with one alternation. It follows from Theorem 4.1 that we can construct an APT accepting [[Φ γ ]] G (where G is as defined in Section 3) whose emptiness can be solved in 2EXPTIME. Hence, the problem is in 2EXPTIME.
Hardness in 2EXPTIME follows easily from the 2EXPTIME-hardness of LTL synthesis [34] . Indeed, synthesis against a hostile environment can be reduced to rational synthesis against an agent whose objective is true.
Remark 4.3
In the above we have shown how to solve the problem of rational synthesis. It is easy to extend our algorithm to solve the problem of rational control, where one needs to control a system in a way it would satisfy its specification assuming its environment consists of rational agents whose objectives are given. Technically, the control setting induces the game to start with, thus the strategy trees are no longer Σ-trees, and rather they are (S × Σ)-trees, where S is the state space of the system we wish to control.
Solution in the Multi-Valued Setting
As discussed in Section 1, classical applications of game theory consider games with quantitative payoffs. The extension of the synthesis problem to the rational setting calls also for an extension to the quantitative setting. Unfortunately, the full quantitative setting is undecidable already in the context of model checking [3] . In this section we study a decidable fragment of the quantitative rational synthesis problem: the payoffs are taken from finite De-Morgan lattices. A lattice A, ≤ is a partially ordered set in which every two elements a, b ∈ A have a least upper bound (a join b, denoted a ∨ b) and a greatest lower bound (a meet b, denoted a ∧ b). A lattice is distributive if for every a, b, c ∈ A, we have a ∧ (b ∨ c) = (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c). De-Morgan lattices are distributive lattices in which every element a has a unique complement element ¬a such that ¬¬a = a, De-Morgan rules hold, and a ≤ b implies ¬b ≤ ¬a. Many useful payoffs are taken from finite De-Morgan lattices: all payoffs that are linearly ordered, payoffs corresponding to subsets of some set, payoffs corresponding to multiple view-points, and more [15, 16] .
We specify qualitative specifications using the temporal logic latticed LTL (LLTL, for short), where the truth value of a specification is an element in a lattice. For a strategy profile π and an LLTL objective ϕ i of Agent i, the payoff of Agent i in π is the truth value of ϕ i in outcome(π). A synthesizer would like to find a profile π in which payoff 0 (π) is as high as possible. Accordingly, we define the latticed rational synthesis as follows.
Definition 5.1 (Latticed Rational Synthesis) Consider a solution concept γ. The problem of latticed rational synthesis (with solution concept γ) is to return, given LLTL formulas ϕ 0 , . . . , ϕ n and a lattice value v ∈ Ł, a strategy profile π = π 0 , π 1 , . . . , π n ∈ Π 0 × Π 1 × · · · × Π n such that (a) payoff 0 (π) ≥ v and (b) the strategy profile π 1 , . . . , π n is a solution in the game G π 0 with respect to the solution concept γ.
In the Boolean setting, we reduced the rational-synthesis problem to decidability of ESL. The decision procedure for ESL is based on the automata-theoretic approach, and specifically on APT's. In the lattice setting, automata-theoretic machinery is not as developed as in the Boolean case. Consequently, we restrict attention to LLTL specifications that can be translated to deterministic latticed Büchi word automata (LDBW), and to the solution concept of Nash equilibrium. 6 An LDBW can be expanded into a deterministic latticed Büchi tree automata (LDBT), which is the key behind the analysis of strategy trees. It is not hard to lift to the latticed setting almost all the other operations on tree automata that are needed in order to solve rational synthesis. An exception is the problem of emptiness. In the Boolean case, tree-automata emptiness is reduced to deciding a two-player game [12] . Such games are played between an ∨-player, who has a winning strategy iff the automaton is not empty (essentially, the ∨-player chooses the transitions with which the automaton accepts a witness tree), and a ∧-player, who has a winning strategy otherwise (essentially, the ∧-player chooses a path in the tree that does not satisfy the acceptance condition). A winning strategy for the ∨-player induces a labeled tree accepted by the tree automaton.
In latticed games, deciding a game amounts to finding a lattice value l such that the ∨-player can force the game to computations in which his payoff is at least l. The value of the game need not be achieved by a single strategy and algorithms for analyzing latticed games consider values that emerge as the join of values obtained by following different strategies [16, 36] . A labeled tree, however, relates to a single strategy. Therefore, the emptiness problem for latticed tree automata, to which the latticed rational synthesis is reduced, cannot be reduced to solving latticed games. Instead, one has to consider the single-strategy variant of latticed games, namely the problem of finding values that the ∨-player can ensure by a single strategy. We address this problem below.
Theorem 5.2
Consider a latticed Büchi game G. Given a lattice element l, we can construct a Boolean generalizedBüchi game G l such that the ∨-player can achieve value greater or equal l in G using a single strategy iff the ∨-player wins in G l . The size of G l is bounded by |G| · |Ł| 2 and G 1 has at most |Ł| acceptance sets.
Using Theorem 5.2, we can solve the latticed rational synthesis problem in a fashion similar to the one we used in the Boolean case. We represent strategy profiles by Σ-labeled Σ-trees, and sets of profiles by tree automata. We construct two Boolean generalized-Büchi tree automata. The first, denoted A 0 , for the language of all profiles π in which payoff 0 (π) ≥ v, and the second, denoted A N , for the language of all Nash equilibria. The intersection of A 0 and A N then contains all the solutions to the latticed rational synthesis problem. Thus, solving the problem amounts to returning a witness to the nonemptiness of the intersection, and we have the following.
Theorem 5.3 The latticed rational-synthesis problem for objectives in LDBW and the solution concept of Nash equilibrium is in EXPTIME.
We note that the lower complexity with respect to the Boolean setting (Theorem 4.2) is only apparent, as the objectives are given in LDBWs, which are less succinct than LLTL formulas [15, 20] .
Discussion
We introduced rational synthesis -synthesizing a system that functions in a rational environment. As in traditional synthesis, one cannot control the agents that constitute the environment. Unlike traditional synthesis, the agents have objectives, we can suggest a strategy for each agent, and we can assume that rational agents follow strategies they have no incentive to deviate from.
The solution of the rational synthesis problem relies on an extension of strategy logic [7] . The modularity of our solution separates the game-theoretic considerations and the synthesis technique. Indeed our technique can be applied to any solution concept that can be expressed in extended strategy logic. We show that for the common solution concepts of dominant strategies equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, and subgame perfect equilibrium, rational synthesis has the same complexity as traditional synthesis The versatility of the extended logic enables many extensions of the setting. For example, one can associate different solutions concepts with different subspecifications. In particular, it is often desirable in practice to ensure that some properties of the system hold regardless of the rationality of the agents. This can be done by letting the specifier specify, in addition to ϕ 0 , also an LTL formula ϕ ′ 0 (typically ϕ 0 → ϕ ′ 0 ) that should be satisfied in the traditional synthesis interpretations, namely in all environments. Figure 1: A game, two Nash equilibria and one subgame-perfect equilibrium.
